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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Should issue preclusion apply to determinations made in workers' 
compensation proceedings? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The general rule of res judicata supports our modern civil system 
requirement that all claims and counterclaims to be brought in one action. A 
number of exceptions to the general rule of res judicata apply when the 
assumptions supporting our modern civil system do not apply. In particular, issue 
preclusion should not apply (1) when the first action involves a statutory scheme 
that provides a summary, expedited procedure, (2) when the procedures available 
in the first action are inappropriate to apply to the determination of the same issues 
when presented in the context of a much larger claim, (3) when differences in 
procedural rules governing the proceedings could result in a different outcome, (4) 
when differences in the values at stake in the proceedings affect the parties' 
financial incentives to vigorously pursue or defend claims, (5) when differences in 
jurisdiction of the forums limit the grounds or theories presented in the first action, 
and (6) when the adjudication of facts in the first action are determined under a 
different rule of law. 
All of the foregoing exceptions apply to workers' compensation 
proceedings. Any one of them could, standing alone, support a conclusion that 
issue preclusion should not apply to workers' compensation decisions. 
BACKGROUND 
Gudmundson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits and a third 
party civil action for injuries arising from exposure to toxic fumes while at work. 
Gudmundson's claim for workers' compensation benefits was denied after a 
finding that her injuries were not caused by exposure to toxic fumes. The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the third party Defendants based on 
issue preclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
UAJ's position is that issue preclusion should not apply to workers' 
compensation decisions because of policy considerations and other factors. This 
brief does not address whether the specific elements required to invoke issue 
preclusion were met in this particular case. Instead, this brief assumes that the 
elements necessary to invoke issue preclusion are satisfied - although UAJ 
recognizes that Gudmundson argues that they are not - and addresses the policy 
considerations and other factors that would preclude application of issue 
preclusion generally to workers' compensation determinations. 
Issue preclusion is a branch of res judicata that prevents parties from 
relitigating facts and issues in a second suit that were fully litigated in a first suit. 
See Buckner v. Kerinard, 2004 UT 78 % 12, 99 P.3d 842. 
But issue preclusion is not a "universally applicable principle" and is only 
warranted where its purposes are served, including: (1) preserving the integrity of 
2 
the judicial system; (2) promoting judicial economy; and (3) protecting litigants 
from harassment by vexatious litigation. Id. at % 14. 
Further, its application in some cases can yield an unjust outcome, 
especially when a party seeking to invoke issue preclusion offensively was not a 
party in the first suit. See id. at ^ 14 and 15. Thus, policy considerations and 
other factors limit the application of issue preclusion and courts should therefore 
carefully consider whether to grant preclusive effect to a prior decision. See id. at 
U 15 and j^ 30 (refusing to give nonmutual preclusive effect to arbitration decisions 
in light of public policy supporting inexpensive and speedy alternative dispute 
methods); see also State in Interest of J.JT., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (expressing concern about applying res judicata to child custody 
proceedings); and In re Juvenile Appeal (83-DE), 460 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Conn. 
1983) (noting that doctrines of preclusion should be flexible and must give way 
when their mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on 
values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal 
controversies). 
In Buckner, this Court considered the policies supporting arbitration in light 
of the purposes supporting issue preclusion and concluded that the justifications 
for promoting arbitration and for applying issue preclusion did not require giving 
nonmutual preclusive effect to arbitration decisions. Some of these considerations 
apply with more force to the application of issue preclusion to worker's 
compensation decisions because worker's compensation claims are the exclusive 
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remedy an injured worker has against an employer, and therefore, the workers5 
compensation proceedings, unlike arbitration, are not voluntary. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. §34A-2-105(1) (2007). 
Following the analysis in Buckner, denying nonmutual application of issue 
preclusion to a workers' compensation decision does not expose parties to 
harassment by vexatious litigation. Instead, it only prevents a third party from 
gaining vicarious advantage from a litigation victory won by another. And it does 
not undermine judicial economy because a worker's compensation claim and a tort 
claim are cumulative. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-106(l) (2007). 
Applying nonmutual issue preclusion, however, would increase the risks at 
stake in a workers' compensation proceedings when a worker has a third party 
claim, and therefore, intensify litigation. It would undermine the benefits derived 
from the more relaxed and expedited procedures applicable to workers' 
compensation proceedings. And finally, it would undermine public policy 
supporting a speedy and inexpensive claims process. 
The Buckner Court only addressed a few of the policy considerations 
supporting issue preclusion. So a discussion of the historical development of issue 
preclusion can aid the Court's understanding of the purposes served by issue 
preclusion and the reasons behind various exceptions to the general rule of 
preclusion. 
Back sometime before my earthly existence, cases involving law and equity 
were administered by different courts. See Petty v. Clark, 129 P.2d 568, 569 
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(Utah 1942). Under that system, a party was often required to bring multiple suits 
to determine the action. See id. at 570. For example, in Petty v. Clark, this Court 
explained that two different suits were potentially required for a party to obtain a 
full recovery in a breach of a real estate contract action. See id. 
Under the common law, a party who lost an action grounded in one theory 
could pursue another action based on another theory even thought the acts that 
gave rise to the actions were identical. See Restatement (Second ) Judgments § 24 
cmt. a (explaining rationale supporting purposes of merger and bar). In those 
days, if the "defendant had invaded a number of primary rights conceived to be 
held by the plaintiff, the plaintiff had the same number of claims, even though they 
all sprang from a unitary occurrence." Id. 
In contrast, a modern procedural system usually provides parties with the 
means to fully develop the entire transaction in one action. A modern system 
requires all claims and counterclaims to be brought in one action without regard to 
distinctions between law and equity, allows general pleadings, allows amendment 
of pleadings, and allows mutually inconsistent allegations. See id. Accordingly, 
the "law of res judicata now reflects the expectation that parties who are given the 
capacity to present their 'entire controversies' shall in fact do so." Id. 
The Restatement recognizes that the law of res judicata rests on the 
foregoing procedural assumptions. It follows that exceptions to the general rule of 
res judicata apply when the foregoing assumptions are absent. See id. 
Accordingly, issue preclusion is unwarranted: 
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when the first action involves a statutory scheme that provides a summary, 
expedited procedure, Restatement (Second) Judgments § 26 cmt e; 
when wCthe procedures available in the first court [are] tailored to the 
prompt, inexpensive determination of small claims and thus . . . wholly 
inappropriate to the determination of the same issues when presented in the 
context of a much larger claim," Restatement (Second) Judgments § 28 
cmt. d.1 
when differences in procedural rules governing the proceedings could result 
in a different outcome; see Restatement (Second) Judgments § 29(2); 
when differences in the values at stake in the proceedings affect the parties' 
financial incentives to vigorously pursue or defend claims, see Parklane 
Hoisery Co,, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); 
when differences in jurisdiction of the forums limit the grounds or theories 
presented in the first action, see Restatement (Second) Judgments § 25 cmt 
e (noting that if court in the first action did not have jurisdiction to entertain 
omitted theory or ground then a second action presenting the omitted 
ground should not be precluded), § 25 cmt. f (noting that preclusion is 
narrower when a procedural system in fact does not permit the plaintiff to 
claim all possible remedies in one action); and § 26(c) (stating that 
1
 All of the relevant considerations pertinent to determining whether issue 
preclusion should be applicable between the party sought to be bound and the 
adversary with whom he originally litigated are applicable when issue preclusion 
is invoked by a non-party. See Restatement (Second) Judgments § 28 cmt. b. 
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preclusive effect won't be given when plaintiff was unable to seek a certain 
remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the courts); and 
• when the adjudication of facts in the first action are determined under a 
different rule of law, see Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States 
Tel & Tel Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Utah 1992). 
Each of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule of res judicata apply to 
workers' compensation determinations. A discussion of each exception follows 
below. 
A NUMBER OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF RES 
JUDICATA APPLY TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
DETERMINATIONS 
A„ Differences exist in the rule of law governing workers' 
compensation proceedings and tort actions 
Issue preclusion should not apply to workers' compensation decisions 
because the law governing workers' compensation claims is different than the 
laws governing a tort claim. This Court noted that res judicata only bars a second 
adjudication "under the same rule of law." Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. 
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Utah 1992). This Court 
pointed out in Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315, that 
negligence claims and compensation claims involve "very different presumptions" 
and standards of proof. Id. f 7 n. 1. Further, this Court noted that the method 
utilized to resolve certain questions in a workers' compensation claim is 
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"markedly different" than the method used in a negligence claim. Thus, this Court 
concluded that importing workers' compensation rules into negligence cases 
"would not be wise . . . because the legal effect of identical facts may be different 
in a negligence case than in a worker's compensation case." Id.; see also Spencer 
v. V.I.R, Inc., 910 A.2d 366, 371 (Me. 2006) (refusing to apply workers' 
compensation standards to tort claim because the standards are different "serve 
different purposes and effectuate different policies."). 
The Ahlstrom case involved a civil case where a city employee who caused 
a collision while driving a city vehicle was not found to be in the course of 
employment at the time she caused a collision; so the city was not vicariously 
liable for her negligence. But later she was found to be in the course of 
employment when she applied for workers' compensation benefits for injuries she 
sustained in the collision. The city appealed that determination in Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Labor Com% 153 P.3d 179 (Utah 2007). This Court noted in that case 
the different standards and purposes applicable to workers' compensation 
proceedings and tort actions justify the apparently conflicting findings in the two 
cases. See id. at f^ 18. 
This Court did not apply issue preclusion to the determination in the civil 
action that the city employee was not in the course of employment. And had the 
appeals board of the Labor Commission ruled first on whether the city employee 
was in the course of employment at the time of the collision, Ahlstrom could have 
argued, as the appellees do here, that the city was prohibited from relitigating the 
8 
issue in the civil case under the doctrine of issue preclusion. But it seems that 
such a finding would be inconsistent with the Court's determination that different 
results can come from applying the different standards found in workers' 
compensation and tort actions. Thus, issue preclusion should not apply to 
workers' compensation determinations because different standards govern 
workers' compensation and tort actions. 
B. Differences in the jurisdiction of the forums limit the grounds or 
theories presented in each 
The assumptions supporting the general res judicata rule do not apply to 
workers' compensation proceedings because a worker's claim to workers' 
compensation benefits is processed in a different forum than the worker's third 
party tort claim. Under Utah law, an injured worker has two potential claims: (1) 
a worker's compensation claim against his employer and (2) a tort claim against a 
third party. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-106 (2007); see also UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 34A-2-105(1) (2007) (providing that workers compensation claim is 
exclusive remedy against employer); and Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 
2000 UT 90, 15 P.3d 1030 (holding that Workers' Compensation Act is not the 
exclusive remedy for injured employees who seek to recover from someone who is 
not their employer and such employees do have viable claims against such third 
parties). 
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This Court explained that the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") was to 
benefit injured employees "and not to impair or destroy natural rights which exist 
by reason of the common law to sue for redress of wrongful acts." Lanier v. Pyne, 
508 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1973). The Worker's Compensation Act expressly 
preserves the right for the employee to sue a negligent third party for damages. 
See Shell Oil Co. v. Br inker hoff Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983) 
and UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-106(1) (2007) (providing worker with the right to 
simultaneously maintain both a compensation claim and a third party claim). The 
Act does not require an election of remedies. Thus, the right to workers' 
compensation benefits and the right to pursue a third party tort claim are clearly 
cumulative. 
However, a worker is barred from bringing both claims in one proceeding. 
See Working RX, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Fund, 2007, 2007 UT App 376, 
173 P.3d 853 (stating that district courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over 
cases that fall within the purview of the Workers' Compensation Act). Thus, issue 
preclusion should not apply to workers' compensation proceedings because the 
assumptions supporting the general res judicata rule do not apply when claims 
arising from one transaction are split and adjudicated in different forums. 
This position has support in Utah decisions. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has held that res judicata should not apply to decisions made by an administrative 
agency that lacks jurisdiction to resolve the claim. See SMP, Inc. v. Kirkrnan, 843 
P.2d 531, 533 -534 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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Similarly, this Court refused to apply res judicata to a small claims court 
proceeding because of the limited jurisdiction of the small claims court. See Faux 
v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1986). In Faux, this Court noted that a small 
claims court is a creature of statute and its jurisdiction "is not exclusive and is 
limited." Id. at 1374. This Court noted that small claims courts were intended to 
dispense "speedy justice between the parties." Id. at 1375. To further that 
purpose, this Court concluded that the defendant in the small claims court 
proceeding was not compelled to bring a counterclaim and a subsequent action by 
the defendant against the plaintiff "was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata." 
Id. 
Courts of other states refuse to apply issue preclusion to workers' 
compensation proceedings because of the limited jurisdiction of the administrative 
agency. In Le Pare Community Ass'n v. Worker's Comp., 110 Cal.App. 4l 1161 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003), the California Court of Appeals discussed in length res 
judicata and its application to workers' compensation decisions. The court 
explains the general rule and notes that splitting claims is generally prohibited. It 
then notes the exception to the "general rule of indivisibility of a primary right" if 
the plaintiff was precluded from asserting a second action on a different legal 
theory because of limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the first forum. 
Id. (citing Restate (Second) Judgments § 26). 
The court also points out another exception to issue preclusion when 
"administrative and civil proceedings afford cumulative remedies that cannot all 
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be sought in one proceeding.55 Id. In such circumstances, the statutory scheme 
plainly envisions that both an administrative proceeding and a civil action may be 
brought; "and res judicata does not apply.55 Id. 
The court then explains that an injured worker has two primary rights, the 
right to no-fault workers5 compensation benefits and a common law tort claim. 
The court notes that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under the workers5 
compensation laws to determine the employee's right to worker's compensation 
benefits and that tort damages were not available in a workers' compensation 
proceeding. It then concluded, "In light of the Legislature's express intent to 
permit cumulative recoveries, resolution of the first proceeding, whether by 
dismissal with prejudice or any other form of judgment on the merits, cannot be 
given res judicata effect that bars continued litigation of the second action. The 
contrary position asserted by the workers' compensation administrative law judge 
and adopted by Le Pare would, in effect, make the remedies mutually exclusive, in 
direct conflict with the statutory command that they be cumulative." 
The same conclusion was reached by the Delaware Supreme Court. In 
Messick v. Star Enterprise, 655 A.2d 1209 (Del. 1995), a worker claimed that he 
had a heart attack due to inhalation of gases while on his job. He lost on the 
causation issue during his workers' compensation proceedings. The worker 
argued that if an election of remedies was required he would be forced to choose 
between trying to secure immediate workers compensation benefits or instituting a 
lengthier and, possibly more remunerative, third party action. The court explains 
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that the risk of an adverse decision in the workers' compensation proceeding 
"forced an election of remedies in contravention of the statute." Id. The court 
notes that the only way to eliminate the risk is to litigate the third party claim first. 
But that would defeat the purpose of the workers' compensation law because the 
worker would have to forego immediate assistance "in the hope that he wins his 
third party suit." The court also points out that giving nonmutual preclusive effect 
to workers' compensation proceedings would give third parties an incentive to 
delay litigation to see if the worker loses the workers' compensation claim and use 
issue preclusion as a shield even though the worker, if successful in the workers' 
compensation proceeding, cannot use issue preclusion as a sword against the third 
party. 
In sum, the Restatement's position that issue preclusion should not apply to 
decisions made in a forum with limited jurisdiction is supported by Utah's 
Workers' Compensation Act, which expressly grants a worker the right to 
simultaneously pursue a claim for benefits and a third party tort claim. The 
cumulative rights afforded injured workers would be impaired if issue preclusion 
applied to workers' compensation decisions because a worker would be forced to 
make an election of remedies. 
C. A workers' compensation claim is processed pursuant to a statutory 
scheme that provides a summary, expedited procedure 
Issue preclusion should not apply to workers' compensation decisions 
because a workers' compensation claim is processed pursuant to a statutory 
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scheme that provides a summary, expedited procedure. See Restatement (Second) 
Judgments § 26 cmt e. The Restatement provides the following illustration and 
explanation in support of its position: 
For nonpayment of rent, landlord A brings a summary action to 
dispossess tenant B from leased premises. A succeeds in the action. 
A then brings an action for payment of the past due rent. The action 
is not precluded if, for example, the statutory system discloses a 
purpose to give the landlord a choice between, on the one hand, an 
action with expedited procedure to reclaim possession which does 
not preclude and may be followed by a regular action for rent, and, 
on the other hand, a regular action combining the two demands. Id. 
Illustration 5. 
A workers' compensation proceeding falls under this exception because it 
involves an expedited proceeding and allows the worker to simultaneously pursue 
a third party tort claim. The Act is a comprehensive scheme intended to provide 
speedy compensation to injured workers. The Act "creates a no-fault type 
insurance protection scheme for work-related injuries in lieu of traditional 
common law tort remedies." Sheppick v. Albertson 's, 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 
1996). Although the amount of compensation a worker can receive under the Act 
is typically limited compared to a tort claim, "compensation is available without 
regard to fault, is more flexible in providing for physical disabilities and loss of 
wages, medical benefits, and benefits for dependents and survivors, and is 
provided more speedily and generally with less expense." Id. Thus, "proceedings 
for workers' compensation claims are very informal." Color Country 
Management v. Labor Com% 2001 UT App 370, 38 P.3d 969. 
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The policy supporting a speedy determination of benefits owed to injured 
workers would be undermined by applying issue preclusion to workers' 
compensation decisions because the consequences of an adverse decision would 
lead to more intense litigation. 
If a party is aware of the potential (and perhaps not wholly 
foreseeable) preclusive effects of a judgment, he may feel compelled 
to over-litigate an issue, or pursue an appeal that might not otherwise 
be taken, out of fear of the consequences in later litigation. 
Restatement (Second) Judgments, Title E, Introductory Note; 
This is the reason the Michigan Court of Appeals declined to apply issue 
preclusion to workers' compensation proceedings. "[W]e note that application of 
judicial estoppel in the present case would undermine worker's compensation 
policy objectives by increasing employers' litigiousness in worker's compensation 
proceedings." Horn v. Department of Corrections, 548 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. App. 
1996). 
D. The value at stake in a workers' compensation proceeding versus a 
third party claim affects the worker's financial incentive to 
vigorously pursue a compensation claim 
The potential compensation to worker under the Act is significantly less 
than the potential compensation the worker might recover in a third party tort 
claim. Thus, a worker has less incentive to vigorously pursue a worker's 
compensation claim when the worker simultaneously files a third party tort claim. 
Issue preclusion should not apply when differences in the values at stake in the 
proceedings affect the parties' financial incentives to vigorously pursue or defend 
15 
claims. See Parklane Hoisery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); see also 
Judge Learned Hand in Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944) 
(stating "[I]t often works very harshly inexorably to make a fact decided in the 
first suit conclusively establish . . . a fact 'ultimate' in the second. The stake in the 
first suit may have been too small to justify great trouble and expense in its 
prosecution or defense.'"); Restatement (Second) Judgments § 27 cmt. e. (noting 
that "[t]here are many reasons why a party may choose not to raise an issue, or to 
contest an assertion, in a particular action. The action may involve so small an 
amount that litigation of the issue may cost more than the value of the lawsuit."); 
and Restatement (Second) Judgments § 28(5)(c) (explaining that "[relitigation of 
issues is not precluded when the party sought to be precluded did not have an 
adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action."). 
The foregoing principle is supported by the following illustration: 
In the crash of C's plane, A and B are killed. In a wrongful death 
action by A's representative, a judgment is awarded of $35,000 
despite evidence establishing damages recoverable by A's 
representative substantially exceeding that amount. In a subsequent 
action for the wrongful death of B, C is not precluded as to the issue 
of liability. 
Restatement (Second) Judgments § 29 cmt. g. illustration 7. 
The Act provides limited benefits to a worker compared to the types of 
damages the worker may recover in a tort claim. For example, a worker's 
compensation for disability benefits equals only two-thirds of the worker's 
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average weekly wages, subject to other limitations. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-
2-408 and 34A-2-412. 
Further, attorney fees in workers' compensation cases are significantly 
limited. See Admin. R. 602-2-4 (forcing attorneys to charge contingency fee, 
limiting fee to amount recovered for disability benefits, and capping fee). These 
limitations significantly deter attorneys from vigorously pursuing workers' 
compensation claims. To illustrate, consider my experience handling my first and 
only worker's compensation claim. I represented an illegal alien who was injured 
while building a home. The employer picked my client up in the morning from a 
location known to employers looking to hire illegal aliens. The employer paid my 
client in cash so there was no documentation that my client worked for the 
employer. The claim for worker's compensation benefits was contested because 
the employer denied employing my client. Anyway, after a significant effort on 
my part I was able to obtain full benefits for my client. The amount of benefits 
paid on his behalf was about $60,000. However, about $51,000 was for medical 
bills and only about $9,000 for disability. The administrative rules at the time 
capped fees at 20 percent and precluded me from charging a fee for the medical 
bills. So I got paid about $1,800 for about 60 hours of work. I lost money helping 
that poor guy out (after deducting my overhead costs). 
My practice, and it is shared by most personal injury attorneys, is to handle 
the third party claim and refer a client with a worker's compensation claim to one 
of the few attorneys in the state who exclusively handle workers' compensation 
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claims. These attorneys, who handle a significant volume of cases, develop 
efficiencies in processing these cases to financially warrant the pursuit of claims 
for a relatively small fee (compared to fees earned in third party claims). But 
neither the attorney nor the claimant can financially afford to engage in intense 
litigation of worker's compensation claim. And an attorney who is going to 
generate a small fee from a worker's compensation claim is less likely to pursue a 
claim as vigorously as an attorney who could recover a significantly higher fee for 
the same injuries in a third party claim. 
If issue preclusion applies to workers' compensation decisions it would 
have a chilling effect on the pursuit of workers' compensation claims when a 
worker has a third party claim because attorneys handling the third party claim 
would be less likely to advise a client to pursue a workers' compensation claim 
when there is a risk that the pursuit of workers' compensation benefits could tank 
the third party claim. 
But an injured worker who can maintain a third party claim should be able 
to pursue a speedy recovery of worker's compensation benefits without risk of 
losing his third party claim. 
E. Differences in procedural rules governing workers' compensation 
proceedings and civil litigation could result in a different outcome 
Issue preclusion should not apply to workers' compensation proceedings 
because the use of procedures allowed in civil cases but not allowed in a workers' 
compensation hearing could result in a different outcome. Relitigation of issues is 
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not precluded when there are differences in the quality or extensiveness of the 
procedures followed in the two courts. Restatement (Second) Judgments § 28(3). 
"Preclusion may be withheld when the party against whom it is invoked can 
avail himself of procedures in the second action that were not available to him in 
the first action and that may have been significantly influential in determination of 
the issue. Differences in this regard include such procedures as discovery devices 
and plenary as distinct from summary hearing. It may also be relevant that the 
party against whom preclusion is invoked had no choice, or restricted choice, as to 
the forum in which the issue was litigated." Restatement (Second) Judgments § 29 
cmt. d. 
The procedural differences between workers' compensation proceeding and 
a civil action are significant. As noted above, the workers5 compensation 
proceedings are informal, expedited, and the rules of evidence are relaxed. These 
differences led the Deleware Supreme Court to conclude that issue preclusion 
should not apply to workers' compensation claims. See Messick v. Star 
Enterprise, 655 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Del. 1995) (noting that both forums allow 
claimant opportunity to present a claim but the tools available are not equal and 
could lead to a different outcome (citing Restatement (Second) Judgments § 29(2) 
cmt. d.)). 
Similarly, the Louisiana Court of Appeals refused to apply res judicata to a 
worker's compensation hearing because of differences in procedures. "Although 
both cases involve the same accident and the question of plaintiffs disability, 
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nonetheless, the demands of the parties, the nature of the evidence, and the 
burdens of proof are different in the tort and compensation actions." Robertson v. 
Popeye's Famous Fried Chicken, Inc., 524 So.2d 97 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
One fundamental tool available in civil litigation and not available in 
worker's compensation proceedings is cross examination of medical experts. 
"Cross examination is a fundamental trial right in our judicial system and is an 
essential element of a fair trial and the proper administration of justice." 81 Am. 
Jur. 2d Witnesses § 771 (2004). Cross-examination is "beyond any doubt, the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Wigmore, 
Evidence, § 1367 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974). 
Cross examination of medical experts is not available because medical 
experts are not allowed to testify at workers' compensation hearings. See R. 1102-
03. This procedural difference alone could change the outcome of a case. 
Other procedural differences could make a change in the outcome of a 
determination. A medical panel, and not a jury or judge, makes determinations of 
medical issues in dispute. See id. The hearings are very brief and usually last less 
than two hours (it took me two hours just to format my table of authorities for this 
brief). See id. at 1104. Standards governing the admissibility of expert evidence 
are different. See id. at 1105. Finally, hearsay evidence is admissible in worker's 
compensation proceedings. See id. at 1106. 
All of the foregoing procedural differences could result in a different 
outcome if an issue was litigated in a civil action. Accordingly, issue preclusion 
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should not prevent a claimant from relitigating an issue decided in a workers' 
compensation proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Any one of the foregoing exceptions justify a conclusion that nonmutual 
issue preclusion should not apply to workers' compensation decisions. These 
exceptions show that application of issue preclusion d workers' compensation 
decisions could yield an unjust outcome. Accordingly, UAJ respectfully requests 
that the Court no apply issue preclusion to worker's compensation decisions. 
Dated October 12, 2008. 
c~^ 
Brent Gordon 
Attorney for UAJ 
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